Performing Objecthood
Museums, architecture and the play of artefactuality

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After a decade of literal placement where the object took centre stage, often to reinforce the belief that art was a myth, the object now functions differently. Instead of acting as a sign, foil or tombstone, the object derives its power from being the only solid thing in a world of individualised flux and unreality.

(Sacha Craddock 1994: 56)

INTRODUCTION

Early in Peter Greenaway’s 1987 film The Belly of an Architect, there is a scene in which the assembled cast of characters gives a standing ovation to a building (as it happens it is the Pantheon, in Rome). This episode is intriguing for several reasons. Buildings are not usually applauded, nor, for that matter, are any of the traditional visual arts. Applause is usually reserved for performances, as half of the contract between audience and performer, a ritualized indication of appreciation at the temporal conclusion of a play, musical performance, even, in odd cases, a film. The interest of this scene thus springs from a confusion over what the characters are actually clapping for – is it the performance of the long-dead architect in designing the building? Is it the unconscious ‘performance’ of past and present inhabitants as they use the building, and hence the building as scenography? Or is the applause for the built object itself, as though it had a presence, a subjectivity, that would allow it to take a bow?

Perhaps all of these are true to some extent, but the scene serves as a neat introduction to this paper, since performance is constituted by an audience, and is also inseparable from a certain mode of theatricality. The paper is a discussion of the ways in which theatricality, as formulated by the art critic and historian Michael Fried in his 1967 essay ‘Art and Objecthood’, might be manifest in the contemporary museum: as an institution, as a collection of objects and as museum architecture. In striving to negotiate a meaningful relationship between their audience and their objects, be they art or artefact, many contemporary museums have come to seem like staged and theatrical event-spaces. Applause is above all the sound of an audience making its presence felt, and, as Fried writes, ‘theatre has an audience – it exists for one - in a way the other arts do not’ (1967: 21). The vignette thus allows an examination of the status of the object, at the level of both exhibited artefact and framing building, in contemporary museums. It opens the question of whether objects are still necessary to and definitive of the museum and examines the blurring of disciplinary distinctions between artwork and artefact in the contemporary institution. Importantly, it also opens the question of where and when the art in architecture lies – it is, after all, the art of a performance that merits applause.

I am restricting my reading of Fried’s concept of theatricality to the ‘Art and Objecthood’ essay, which is the earliest of his writings on the subject, and certainly the most canonical and condensed. It thus suits my reading of minimal
or (as Fried insists) ‘literalist’ art as, following Hal Foster, a kind of art-historical ‘crux’, standing broadly for a conceptual change in subject/object relations in art (see Foster 1996). It would be naive to suggest that a particular type of art ‘produces’ a certain type of museum or museum architecture. But the influence of theatricality in art after minimalism is so far-reaching, so pervasive, that it is hard to see how the museum institution, and its architectural frame, could in fact fail to be affected.

What, then, is the proper object of the museum? This is a key question in contemporary museology, as in contemporary culture more broadly. But it is also ambiguous, because of the multivalency of its terms – object and museum – which shift in sense and connotation relative to one another. An ‘object’ exists in the real material realm of the ‘objectival’ and the abstract intentionality of the ‘objective’. It also opens the question of ‘objectivity’, a stance or position of unbiased and absolute judgement, and thus is framed in opposition to subjectivity, the relational and relative position of the individual subject. The ‘object of the museum’ thus refers simultaneously to the purpose of the museum, to its objectival contents and to its particular discursive stance. The meaning of ‘museum’ is also multiple, referring to the museum as a physical entity – a public institution – and as an intellectual construct, an ordering system, one of the principal means by which humankind reorders and re-presents the world. In this sense the ‘museum’ is an apparatus, a technical mechanism for the display and dissemination of knowledge and, importantly, is also a specific building type, an architectural genre. The words ‘museum architecture’ can thus be read as a tautology, or equally as a compound – taking account of the specificity of ‘museum architecture’ within the field of architecture more broadly. This paper seeks to unfurl some of the broad implications of the object, in and of the museum, in and of its architecture, within the context of questions of performance, and thus to discuss the status of the museum object within the institution’s increasingly theatricalized spatial and temporal staging of experience.

THE OBJECT OF THE MUSEUM

Truth, as authorized by the museum, has historically been verified through the presentation and display of things: ‘evidence’ in the form of ‘authentic’ objects (Rabb and Brown 1989, Chandler et al. 1994). The museum is unique precisely through this object-based representation of the world and its history; it is the presence of objects that distinguishes museums from other forms of classificatory system or historical narrative. Of course, the question raised by critical museology is whether such truths are actually constructed in the museum, or whether they already exist and are merely proven by the institution. But in either case, objects play a crucial role as material evidence supporting a particular version of the world and events in it.

Museums may once have aspired to a relatively vague concept of edification, the belief that merely coming into contact with authentic art and artefacts would have a ‘bettering’ effect on their subjects, but their objects are now quite specific. Indeed museums are increasingly under pressure to justify themselves in productive terms. The desire to act upon, entertain and educate the populace, to express and affirm national identity, to attract tourists and even to be a tool for urban renewal – all of these could conceivably be included within the objects of the contemporary museum. Even the most apparently extravagant new museum constructions can be rationalized in terms of their value as iconic ‘brands’ and marketing devices and, on another level, collections have come to be seen as ‘assets’ and the museum’s activities as ‘product’. Of course, there may be nothing wrong with such rationalization, but the trend must be noted for what it reveals about the changing objects of the museum.
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It would once have been commonplace to assert that the archive function, of an ordered and curated collection of actual things, was central to the constitution and definition of museums. But in recent years this assumption has been so systematically challenged as to now seem precarious. Only the research function of museums actually requires an archive. The didactic function can employ objects but does not specifically require them, and the entertainment function increasingly seems better served by interactive digital media and computer interfaces than by genuine artefacts. Technological developments no doubt play a significant role, but to a large extent the present crisis of the museum object is also ideological. It has resulted from a critique of long-held notions of objective truth - both in the sense of absolute truth and in the sense of truth resident in the authentic object - which underpinned the museum in its early modern incarnations. This, then, is one of the central problems of the contemporary museum.

Dumb Things or Eloquent Artefacts?
The status of the museum object, long a question for art theorists (Rosenberg 1965, Lippard 1973), has, in this age of spectacle, simulation and rapidly developing digital-image technologies, extended to historical artefacts. The questions are multiple: is the authentic object expendable or necessary to meaningful museum experience? Exactly what is the affect that artefacts have on museum visitors, and how does this differ from the relationship of objects and people in the outside world? What bearing does museum ‘interactivity’ have on the equation? And exactly how do objects ‘communicate’ or ‘teach’ in museums: do they ‘speak’ or are they mute? On a larger scale, is the museum’s very claim to ‘authenticity’ underpinned by authentic objects, such that a museum with no such objects would, by definition, no longer be a museum? These questions hold considerable weight and are points of continuing debate.

The discourse around the status of the museum object is partly informed by a considerable literature on the analysis or ‘reading’ of material culture (Miller 1987), which borders and in several places overlaps critical museum discourse (Stocking 1985, Pearce 1989). Originating in a range of disciplines, from archaeology through anthropology, from cultural studies analyses of popular culture to the ‘object-centred’ disciplines of art history and criticism, this discourse has been marked by some highly original, interdisciplinary works. Semiotic and structuralist analysis has been influential in providing a model for ‘reading’ objects (Taborsky 1990), but artefacts have also been examined as spoils (Raff 1995), momento mori (Maleuvre 1999), fetish objects (Gathercole 1989, Sherman 1994), fragments (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1991), mnemonic devices (Yates 1966) and souvenirs (Stewart 1993); they have been examined in the context of private collections, as a reflection of individual subjectivity and means of warding off anxiety (Duclos 1999), as psychoanalytic indicators, alter egos and markers of sociological identity.

Many of these analyses are underpinned by the question of whether meaning is inherent, lying hidden within objects, waiting to be deciphered, or whether it lies outside the object and is provided by people, through interpretation and display. Ettema writes that the notion that objects ‘expressed the spirit of the people who made and used them’, and were thus reifications of abstract moral and spiritual characteristics, was fundamental to early museums (Ettema 1987: 66). This ‘formalist’ perspective, associated with the museum’s early history and educative function, has tended to give way in recent years to an ‘analytical’ model, whereby objects are seen not to be inherently meaningful in themselves but able to stand for certain ideas when placed in a network of interpretation. As Eugenio Donato has written,
The set of objects the museum displays is sustained only by the fiction that they somehow constitute a coherent representational universe. The fiction is that a repeated metonymic displacement of fragment for totality, object to label, series of objects to series of labels, can still produce a representation which is somehow adequate to a non-linguistic universe. Such a fiction is the result of an uncritical belief in the notion that ordering and classifying, that is to say, the spatial juxtaposition of fragments, can produce a representational understanding of the world. Should the fiction disappear, there is nothing left of the Museum but ‘bric-a-brac’, a heap of meaningless and valueless fragments of objects.

(1979: 223)

In its most extreme forms, this position is also marked by a shift in emphasis from authentic objects to authentic experience. Lisa C. Roberts, one of few museum theorists to have systematically examined what ‘authentic experience’ might actually be, draws on the work of Miles Orvell to propose a shift towards a ‘culture of authenticity’ in the early twentieth century, a shift that mitigated the apparent ‘inauthenticity’ of modern existence (Roberts 1997, Orvell 1989). At this time experience began to be discussed as a measure of access to the ‘real’, which is counterpoint to the more contemporary discourse on simulation and the ‘absolute fake’, associated with Jean Baudrillard and Umberto Eco (Baudrillard 1983, Eco 1995). Artefacts, conceived as ‘sites of experience’, increasingly seem replaceable with replicas, representations or interactive interfaces (Hein 1998: 106).

All of this opens a larger question about the philosophical base of museums, whether it lies in the material or is conceptual – in other words whether the museum’s real object is things or ideas (Weil 1990: 48). This distinction is more than simply a question of historical veracity – it is significant because of the completely different, even mutually exclusive, meanings that the two approaches ascribe to individual artefacts. Where objects in a Wunderkammer or personal collection may stand only for themselves, things chosen to represent one part of an overriding conceptual model are valued more as evidence supporting that model than as objects in their own right (Kavanagh 1998). On the question of whether objects ‘speak’, Crew and Sims are unequivocal: ‘The problem with things is that they are dumb. They are not eloquent, as some thinkers in art museums claim. They are dumb. And if by some ventriloquism they seem to speak, they lie’ (Crew and Sims 1991: 159).

When is an Object not an Object?

Distinct genres of museum are usually understood both to dictate and to be derived from the particular category of their objectival contents – art museums are distinguished because they contain artworks, and so on. It is a curious fact, however, that in the history of museums, art which was itself old could be displayed in the history museum, whereas art that took historical events as its subject could equally be displayed in the art museum, in isolation both from the material evidence of the events it depicted, and other monuments or memorials to those events. The question of how a work can oscillate between the register of anthropology and art – between an existence as an artefact and as an artwork – according to the conditions of its museological framing and definition, remains both fascinating and revealing.

To examine an artwork in the context of the physical, social, political and cultural circumstances that gave rise to it is to reconstitute it as another category of anthropological artefact; this much is clear. But such a conception runs directly counter to the idea of art as a transcendent realm, rising above the specific and contingent in pursuit of timelessness and universality; counter, that is, to the idea of art as autonomous. Such a conception of art is uniquely enshrined in the art museum – the techniques and modes of display, the apparent ‘neutrality’ of the gallery...
space, the arrangement of works in art historical groupings, the taxonomic categories under which each work is listed, all of these contribute to a reading of art as disinterested, rightly isolated from the world in a separate realm with its own immutable laws. Another way of putting this might be that certain art objects are seen to be autonomous, not only of the political and social conditions of their own production, but also of being objects at all.

Following this logic, the distinction between anthropological, evidential, decipherable artefacts and aesthetic, atemporal, self-contained and self-explanatory artworks is one between things that have a clearly defined object character and things that do not. The dematerialization of the art object, and the rise of multi-media and intermediary works, can all be seen to demonstrate the potential fate of the museum object in general. On the other hand, it is possible to imagine that long after museum artefacts were all replaced with simulations, artworks would continue to be enshrined in art museums, with ideas of authenticity and embodied truth left intact. Artworks, as the 'highest' and most abstract of museum contents, can thus be seen as a kind of limit condition, a complexification of the crisis of the museum object more generally. And it is in this context that the work of Michael Fried remains so significant.

'ART AND OBJECTHOOD'

In 'Art and Objecthood', Fried argued for the inherent formal values of high modern sculpture and painting, as against the intermediality of Minimal (or Literalist) art. Fried's thesis is important here for its assertion that artworks can be distinguished from artefacts at all, and that this distinction turns upon the presence or absence of the quality of 'objecthood'. But more than this, the essay notes that a deliberate play on the edges between art and objecthood can be a legitimate aesthetic strategy in itself. Given that such a play is now also occurring in museums, Fried's essay provides a route to approach the blurring of disciplinary distinctions between art and history, artwork and artefact, object and theatre in the museum institution.

Fried rails against what he sees as an increasingly 'theatrical' turn in the contemporary art of the day. Contrasting the work of Minimalists such as Donald Judd and Robert Morris against high Modernist painting and sculpture, Fried finds that Minimalism, though three dimensional, seeks to avoid being classified as either painting or sculpture. He argues that unlike a high Modernist work which denies its base physical existence to the extent that it is 'in some essential respect not an object', the Minimalist work flaunts or emphasizes its artefactual or object character - its 'objecthood'. By flirting with the appearance of objecthood, that is, the quality that all non-art objects have, Minimalism is thus engaging in a theatrical game with the spectator around the question of whether or not it is art. Minimalism deliberately blurs categorical definitions, confusing the distinction not only between painting and sculpture, but also between art and non-art. It is this projection of 'objecthood' that enables a Minimalist art object to masquerade as a mere 'object in the world' - that is to say, an artefact - by duplicitously approximating the 'look of non-art'. Playing on the beholder's expectations of what an art object should look like, or rather what it shouldn't look like, Minimalism is engaged in a self-reflexive game of charades.

Fried also frames his objection to Minimalism around the fact that it is relational. Unlike Modernist painting and sculpture, where relationships are all internal, produced by the formal necessities of a particular medium, Minimalism initiates relationships both between media and with elements that are outside of the work altogether. These elements include the architectural setting - the space and ambient effects in which the work is displayed - and the audience: 'Literalist sensibility is theatrical because, to begin with, it is concerned
with the actual circumstances in which the beholder encounters literalist work... the experience of literalist art is of an object in a situation - one which, virtually by definition, includes the beholder (Fried 1967: 15). A relationship between art object and perceiving subject is thus initiated, based upon the artwork’s oddly human ‘presence’ in the space, a ‘confronting’ presence that ‘demands that the beholder take it into account’ (1967: 16). In Fried’s terms Minimalist art not only involves but is actually constituted by its audience, and by the specific situation in which the beholder apprehends the work. Furthermore, the relationship is also a function of time, the duration of the beholder’s experience of the work. While time is irrelevant to the apprehension of a hieratic Modernist art work, which in Fried’s terms enjoys the transcendent ‘grace’ of ‘presentness’, time as an actual element of the Minimalist work imbues it with the mundane, everyday quality of ‘presence’.

In the decades since the publication of ‘Art and Objecthood’, Fried’s identification of theatricality, the knowing acknowledgement of a beholder, as a primary characteristic of minimal art has proven to be prescient. The theatricality of Minimalism has been revealed as not an isolated occurrence but an early and paradigmatic instance of a more general trend. Much of the post-Minimal, performance, installation and new media art produced up until the present day displays such theatricality, and the acknowledgement of a subjective audience is now commonplace in contemporary art practice. Furthermore, works that would once have been tools of institutional critique, and stretched the definitions of art, have found their place in museums; the theatrical is now thoroughly institutionalized.

In light of this, it is significant but not altogether surprising that the trend can also be discerned in museums themselves. Contemporary exhibition design and modes of museum display, and contemporary installation art practice, have come to closely resemble one another. Minimalism’s concern with objecthood is a function of its hybridity, blurring the boundaries of art and life, and it is this same blurring between previously established boundaries - between art and history, museum and life - that is now also manifest in much contemporary museum display and museum architecture.

Fried writes that ‘art degenerates as it approaches the condition of theatre. Theatre is the common denominator that binds a large and seemingly disparate variety of activities to one another, and which distinguishes those activities from the radically different enterprises of the modernist arts’ (Fried 1967: 21). In Fried’s terms theatre is a catch-all. It dissolves and disperses art practice into an ever greater proliferation of media and method, a ‘large and seemingly disparate variety of activities’ that can no longer be recognized as art under conventional definitions. Theatre causes the possibilities for art to explode ever outward, a project that is very different from ‘the enterprises of the modernist arts’, which are concerned with a constant movement inwards, towards what is essential in any single, distinct medium. And this is, significantly, very close to the role played by contemporary museum architecture: binding ‘a large and seemingly disparate variety of activities to one another’, it seems that it is only the museum’s walls, or more pointedly the beholder’s experience of them, that holds together the huge range of objects, subjects, narratives, systems and activities that the contemporary museum encompasses.

**Autonomy and Artefactuality**

Fried is not the only theorist to have observed a certain basic commonality between the ‘highest’ artwork and the ‘lowest’ or most quotidian artefact. Indeed, for Theodor Adorno this object character is not only inherent and inescapable but is also the crucial, literal overlap between autonomous artworks and empirical reality. Such ‘artefactuality’ in Lambert Zuidervaart’s
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terms, namely art’s ‘socio-historical dialectic between artistic materials and material artistry’, thus takes on a crucial significance in Adorno’s thought (Zuidervaart 1985: 256). As he writes, ‘it is precisely as artifacts, as products of social labour, that [artworks] also communicate with the empirical experience that they reject and from which they draw their content [Inhalt]. Art negates the categorical determinations stamped on the empirical world and yet harbors what is empirically existing in its own substance’ (Adorno 1997: 5). This position explicitly acknowledges that an artwork is also a material thing, also an artefact in the neutral sense of being an object of culture. To say that an artwork is a ‘thing’, however, is not to assert that it is a ‘thing among other things’, as Adorno writes,

The need for objective art was not fulfilled in functional means and therefore encroached on autonomous means. It disavows art as the product of human labour, one that nevertheless does not want to be an object, a thing among other things. Art that is simply a thing is an oxymoron. Yet the development of this oxymoron is nevertheless the inner direction of contemporary art.

(1997: 58)

Much of Adorno’s aesthetic theory can be seen as a rearguard action against this ‘inner direction’, which is indeed a significant trend in contemporary art to this day. But the key point here is that Adorno’s position does not abandon the object character of art, but rather notes its importance in the actual constitution of autonomy: Adorno’s reference here to ‘objective art’ affirms both meanings of the word. He allows for an art that is an ‘object’ – having a material reality – and which is also ‘objective’, in the sense of viewing the world from a distanced, disinterested and critical position. More than this, in Adorno’s position art’s object character is what fundamentally links it to empirical reality, and therefore secures its commitment to society; its very object character provides the reason why art would be motivated to look back upon the world at all.

Without wishing to over-schematize these complex and separate theoretical positions, the convergence of Fried and Adorno’s writings around this point – a mutual identification and mistrust of the ‘oxymoron’ of art as ‘simply a thing’ – should be noted. The common thread is a concern with boundaries – between genres of art, between artworks and artefacts, between art and life and, by extension, between the museum and the world. Both Fried and Adorno are concerned with the maintenance of a realm outside of empirical reality, which can act as both a criticism and a corrective to that reality. The collapse of the boundaries between art and life would mean the neutralization of the critical function of autonomous art, equally as it would signal the increasing aestheticization of all other aspects of the empirical world, including the aestheticization of museum processes and practices. But the notion also has implications for exactly how and where autonomous art, in Adorno’s conception, is distinguishable from other ‘things’. If, according to Adorno, the crucial connection between artworks and artefacts lies in the material, the crucial distinction between them lies in form – or more specifically in form as ‘sedimented content’. And this returns us to the question of architecture.

ARCHITECTURAL OBJECTS

Museum architecture is, uniquely, both a museum object and the museum object; it is both form and contents, container and contained. It might be said that museum architecture can objectify the museum’s broader aims, ideologies and modes of display. But importantly, architecture also acts upon the beholder – the museum subject. The programming and choreography of phenomenal experience is increasingly a part of the museum’s overall strategy – plotting not only a particular path through museum space but also a particular experience and affect.

Museum architecture can support, imply or even demand a particular mode of museum
display, that much is clear. Increasingly, museum architects also act as de-facto exhibition designers. It is no longer possible, if it ever was, to draw a clear distinction between architecture and exhibition, just as ‘exhibitionist’ museum architecture is now commonplace. So while the relationship could be seen, on one level, as one of form and content, it needs hardly be said that architectural form has a content of its own, and that the ‘content’ of a museum exercises certain ‘formal’ ideas as well. While ‘architecture’ as a performative art may be seen to encompass the design, fabrication and occupation of buildings, it does not necessarily follow that its art is located in built form. There is a tension between architecture’s place as a tangible thing in the world, its ordering of the experience of a beholder and its existence as an abstract idea. It is unclear whether architecture is located in products or practices. Debates about how and when architecture is an art are very often also, directly or indirectly, debates about its object character. To put this another way, architecture has an inescapable object character, a groundedness as a thing in the world, which complicates its parallel existence as an art.

It is possible, in Friedian terms, to read the relationship established between the Literalist object and its spatial and architectural situation as a kind of dilution of the potency of art. In these terms the Literalist object partially effaced itself by ‘sharing’ its ‘art character’ with the beholder and their environment. But rather than being a diminution of art, this whole process could equally be read as a valorization of architectural space, which becomes more figure than ground.

Furthermore, this diffusion of focus away from the art object and onto the situation was also a kind of ‘outing’ of the role of the gallery or museum space in the physical and ideological framing of art. The modernist art space had served to perpetuate the transcendental ideals of Modern art, but only via deliberately unobtrusive means. If modernist painting or sculpture sought to suspend its objecthood, as though it were, quoting Fried, ‘in some essential respect not an object’ (1967: 15), then this relied on a ‘white cube’ architecture, which was apprehended only peripherally, if at all. It had the same blankness that Fried found in Literalist objects, the blankness of pure objecthood. A dialectical reversal is thus apparent: if anti-theatrical, high Modernist painting and sculpture was most enhanced by an architecture of pure objecthood, the opposite is true of the theatrical arts of post-Minimalism. To counterbalance their own projection of objecthood, to legitimize their ‘non-art’ appearance, such artworks benefit from a theatrical architectural frame.

The idea of a building as ‘in some essential respect not an object’ may seem inherently contradictory, but concepts of three dimensional space as the real ‘material’ of architecture, and of this space only being animated by a beholder’s movement in time, have been long accepted, indeed central aspects of architectural practice. The very notion that architecture could ever not acknowledge its beholder, or rather its user, is entirely problematical. After all, buildings address their occupants in the mute language of ergonomics, they accommodate the shape, orientation and scale of the human body in an anthropomorphism that, although it may be present in art, is never there from necessity. And the single factor that truly divides architecture from art in this respect is function – architecture is used by people in the utilitarian pursuit of their everyday lives. As Walter Benjamin famously noted, architecture thus struggles with the double-edged sword of having an intimate connection with the life-world, but thereby becoming ubiquitous, sinking below the threshold of notice, being apprehended only in a state of distraction.

It was precisely this experience of the everyday, of ‘presence’, understood as a mundane, quotidian quality characteristic of both architecture and literalist art objects, from which Fried wished to protect art. For him it was...
the beholder’s experience of performative duration that displaced the transcendental, timeless instant that is ‘presentness’. Fried ends the ‘Art and Objecthood’ essay with the statement that ‘we are all literalists most or all of our lives. Presentness is grace’ (1967: 23).

This is, in other words, a plea for art to be protected from being experienced the same way that architecture, and theatre, has been all along. To return again to the image with which I began this paper, architecture has always had an audience, but it has most often been an audience unconscious of the performance. To say that contemporary museum buildings set out to be noticed seems obvious unless it is seen in this context – they set out to be noticed and thus to constitute a conscious audience for themselves. These museums want to be noticed in the way that the rest of architecture is not: to be seen the way that Modern art is. Fried’s critique of the theatricality of Literalist art thus offers a means of examining the institution and architecture of contemporary museums. In the expanded field of post-Minimal art, a building can also be a work of theatre, not a specific art object but a generic scenographic stage for experience. Museum architecture, which in all its solidity might be expected to be immune to the dematerialization of the art object, becomes practice, process and performance.

REFERENCES


